
Part I (continued)
ONE (continued)
Inventing Victims:
Despite moral questionaire stories being designed to lack harm to anyone, 38% of the time people tried to fabricate victims perhaps to justify their pre-existing desire to say something was immoral (like eating their pet dog--someone might get sick from it!). Sounds like cognitive dissonance. They know it does not logically seem like a moral thing but they want it to be a moral thing and don't know why. Jon argues that people knew intuitively that something like cutting up an American flag for rags is morally wrong but that they simply lack the understanding to express why. Personally, I think this is entirely cultural upbringing. Whether or not someone sees the cutting of the flag, we all know that, in our culture, we would be looked down upon with extreme disgrace for such an act and thus we assume it's "not right" to do it and thus "immoral." But this is akin to the first stage of moral reasoning mentioned previously: it's wrong because you get in trouble. I can't argue that, but it's not a moral wrong, it's an expedience wrong. It's just not a good idea because you never know if you might be found out and ostracized. Moral Reasoning appears to be a servant to Moral Emotions. David Hume said "reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." Reasoning comes after the emotional decision. This contradicts the commonly held and studied concept of the Rationalist approach to moral psychology. I'm not sure it contradicts anything, to be honest. Everyone already knows that people find different things moral and immoral and that it is hugely influenced by cultural upbringing. The rationalist approach would not argue against that. The rationalist approach seems to argue that it is innate to understand that harm is a moral issue but even that can apparently be affected by cultural norms or else it is not innate to begin with. If not innate, then all is culture. If all is culture, then... everything is truly ambiguous. I'm willing to say it is indeed all ambiguous but that doesn't mean I will call everything "good." I will still hold a moral standing of no harm and others will still hold a moral standing of respect and authority and whatnot. It's good to understand that others hold those things as moral issues, however, even if I disagree. I just can't see them as innate as of yet. It is possible that disgust and respect themselves are innate and where we attribute them is simply cultural, but I don't think the flag thing has anything to do with respect and more to do with fear of stigmatization.
In Sum:
Recap that morals could be derived via nature or nurture but that psychology has focused on the third: rationalism--that morality is self-derived by experiences with harm. Experiences with harm lead to knowing harm is wrong and leads to concepts of fairness and justice. Jon rejects this idea and instead believes that morality varies by culture, Western cultures are much more morally narrow, people have gut-feeling morality with reasoning being post-hoc, morality cannot be self-constructed from harm but must have a lot to do with culture. If morality doesn't come from reasoning, then it must come from a combination of innateness and social learning. Self-taught is still learned and learned is still via experiences. If it's learned by experiencing harm or learned via cultural norms, it is still nurture over nature. This has all made me conclude that there is simply no innateness to our understanding of right and wrong or that it is very easily corrupted at a very early age. I would sooner guess there is no innateness whatsoever for morality except in our ability to learn from experience and put ourselves in other people's shoes. So rationalism sounds like nurture as does Jon's position. So where's the argument?
TWO: The Intuitive Dog and Its Rational Tail
Minds are often conflicted knowing what is right and choosing what is wrong. Rationalist fantasy is that passions ought to be brought under the rule of rational reasoning in opposition to Hume's quote above that reasoning comes second to emotion. I think I see why I'm struggling with this book now. I am absolutely a "rationalist" as described. Our passions should certainly be under the control of our reasoning and not vice versa. To take it to a typical extreme, Hitler post-hoc rationalized his emotional anger at the Jews. If he'd have quelled his emotional plight and used reason instead to control it, he'd have not become a genocidal murderer. We can't allow emotion to control without reason at the head. But, to be fair, we will always feel the emotion first, and from there we need to step back and allow reason to take the lead. So I agree that Hume is correct that emotion does come first, but not that we should give it the reigns once it has taken its leap. It's also quite well known in the psychological world that we can create our own emotions by taking certain actions. If I want to feel happier, I need only force myself to smile. Some emotions will come automatically such as fear which we can react to, but our reaction from reasoning can actually change our emotion from fear to calmness. Our fear leads us to reason and our reasoning leads us to change emotion. Both can be a leader and reason is the far better one except in cases of danger requiring immediate unthinking response time.
Plato held contempt for the passions as seen in his character Timaeus stating that a man who masters his emotions will live a life of reason and justice. He sees this progression from Plato to Immanuel Kant up to Kohlberg. Jon will now call this "worshipful attitude" as the "rationalist delusion." Great. So now I have to listen to him calling me deluded in order to find his point and learn if there's any merit to what he's saying. Already disagreeing with the author, I am much less inclined to continue and learn something new if I am being insulted in the process. Alas, let us continue while I more forcefully attempt to keep an open mind. He calls it a delusion because the subscribers hold it in a sacred regard and thus lose the ability to think clearly about it. True believers create pious fantasies that don't match reality. Hume attempted to knock this idea off its pedestal. Thomas Jefferson, via a letter about a forbidden love, indicates that reason should be used for the sciences and the heart for sentiments and morals. Jon indicates this as a third way where reason doesn't always rule nor do passions but that both have their place. I'm almost down with that idea, but likely not to the extent the author is going to pursue. I don't think "the heart" is its own entity capable of determining morals. Yet at the same time, I think it's good that "the heart" can feel pity and allow us to give to those in need despite it not being logically reasoned out in our own best interests. If everything were pure logic and reasoning then we would never individually be altruistic. Of course, recognizing that, the reasoned mind would then give place to the emotions so that this does not become us. It is still more logical to ensure that everyone else is giving rather than ourselves, but how can that be done without us also giving? It is better then to set the example and allow emotion to do what is good but using our reasoning to regulate if it is truly good and to prevent emotions leading us into harm. It should still lead and direct without hindering the emotions which are good and lead to permitted pleasure without painful recourse.
Wilson's Prophecy
Darwin believed that Sympathy was the foundation of social instinct and that we are pre-wired for emotional moral concepts (i.e. nature/nativism). This got depopularized due to an idea of Social Darwinism--the idea that certain races or cultures were more "fit" given their success and that we should not help the poor and needy since it would be better to allow natural selection to keep the fittest surviving with the weakest dying. Hitler would then be seen as "fitter" with such a mentality so the nativist mentality would equate people to Hitler which is illogical but emotionally satisfying. He says in his own words that something "makes sense" emotionally that is entirely illogical of a conclusion to make. Perhaps, then, he is fine with illogical things? Another illogical conclusion made against nativism is that if certain skills and abilities were native to male or female then gender equality will have a huge unchangeable obstacle and this might justify patriarchal hierarchy and therefore it must be wrong. This is one thing I will agree with the author. It could very well be that there are different native skills based upon gender. While I am unaware of the particular ways this could manifest and whether or not it might truly indicate that men "should" or women "should" do particular things, it should not be dismissed from a perceived moral high ground. Let the facts be what they are. But again, this is the way of the rationalist, not the emotionalist. So it sounds like he's arguing the rationalist side of things here. In "The Blank Slate" by Steven Pinker, he argues that moral progressivism regarding race and gender demonized scientists for evaluating things that might hinder the movement. Edward O Wilson was one such scientist who studied ants and suggested that human nature was also affected by natural selection. Wilson sides with Hume in that rationalists are really justifying their emotional aversions to things like torture in order to indicate that a universal moral right exists. Sure, I can agree with this. The reason I want to keep my 'no harm' concept of morality is in large part because of the emotional sympathy I feel for others. It is also a highly logical course, however, in that we don't want people going around torturing people since this would enable it to occur to me as well. Sympathy and self-preservation alike. But even if I were entirely guaranteed to be unaffected, I would still emotionally decide that it is morally impermissible to harm others for fun. Since I do not believe there is an innate concept of morality at all, this seems sufficiently fine to me. In which case, maybe I'm not a "rationalist" as prescribed, but I am definitely still pro rationality as the filter for emotions.